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Development Bank of Philippines v.
Chemtex Fibers, Inc.: A Vote in
Favor of International Comity
and Commercial Predictability
Private arbitration has become an increasingly attractive vehicle for
commercial dispute resolution. One of the principal reasons behind this
shift toward arbitration in the United States is the fact that crowded court
dockets frequently cause unacceptably long delays for litigants. Avoiding
these delays may be important for a party seeking performance of contractual obligations, as well as for an injured party who seeks damages
for the value of the breached contract. When differences are adjudicated
rapidly, parties can return to their business activities more promptly. This
outcome translates into greater economic efficiency in the free-market
system.
In the international commercial setting, parties may agree to private
arbitration of their disputes mainly for other reasons. One of these reasons
may be that a foreign party will tend to view another nation's judicial
system as inherently untrustworthy. A world riddled with pronounced
ideological and nationalistic tendencies further cautions the foreign party
against submitting himself to another nation's judicial processes. Although
a transnational tribunal cannot ensure a fairer resolution of disputes than
a court of law, it is designed to avoid the taint of national prejudice.
Notwithstanding the assumption that international arbitrators will tend
to be less biased than national officials, their ability to function effectively
is necessarily dependent on the judicial authority of the forum nation.
The powers of national courts may be called upon in any number of
capacities during the arbitration process. These powers may be catego*B.A., 1972, Yale University; M.I.M., 1973, American Graduate School of International
Management; J.D., University of Miami School of Law.
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rized as assistance, intervention, supervision or control, and recognition
and enforcement.' Thus, there is an inescapable national presence that
permeates private international arbitration.
Clearly, private arbitration is ineffective without the host nation's enforcement machinery. Conversely, public intervention by the host nation's
judicial officials presents certain risks. For example, a party to arbitration
may attempt to invoke the power of a forum court to order provisional
relief, such as attachment or forced sale of perishable goods. If such relief
is sought against a party resisting arbitration, then the possibility that it
may be granted may have the salient effect of motivating the resisting
party to begin the arbitration process. Nevertheless, any provisional coercive action taken by a court of law against a party to arbitration carries
with it the risk of resolving components of the dispute that the parties
2
had previously agreed would be resolved only by arbitration.
At this juncture private international law is inextricably caught up in
the public law of the arbitration forum. Decisions of national courts bearing on the proper scope of their intervention powers in private international arbitration are really policy decisions relating to international comity. Those decisions that tend to favor relegation of as many claims as
possible exclusively to the arbitration process indicate a nation's firm
commitment to predictability in the international commercial system. On
the other hand, a court of law in a host nation may reserve for itself
subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular issue that could otherwise be
arbitrable. In such a case, assuming no precedential or statutory constraint, the court makes a policy choice in favor of national sovereignty
over international transactional certainty. 3 The United Nations accepted
the Commission on International Trade Law Model Arbitration Law a
decade ago. 4 A recent draft of the Model Law deleted a provision that
recognized concurrent court control of the arbitration process. 5 Thus, the
1. See, Kerr, Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 34

INT'L

&

COMP.

L.Q. 1,2-3 (1985).
2. See McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in International Commercial

Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273 (1984).
3. This is not to say that the courts of the forum state should not be able to intervene in
appropriate circumstances. It is possible that arbitrators may conduct themselves in an
unauthorized or outrageous manner. To permit such conduct to continue without the possibility of relief until conclusion of the proceedings would be unjust and costly. See Kerr,

supra note I, at 17. Moreover, genuine uncertainty about the validity of an arbitration
agreement itself, or about a specific provision of an arbitration agreement such as a jurisdictional question, requires reference to authority outside the tribunal. Such a legitimate
need, however, should be distinguished from coercive sanctions that summarily decide
factual components of an arbitrable dispute.
4. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), G.A. Res. 98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 182, U.N. Doc. A/31 (1976).

5. Article 17 provided in part:
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Commission has endorsed complete independence of the international
arbitration panel, at least until the conclusion of its proceedings.
Against this background, this Note examines the current posture of
United States case law as it relates to the tension that constantly overshadows international arbitration, namely, the tension between the possibility that a court will reserve jurisdiction over particular issues, and
the competing concerns of commercial predictability and international
comity. Specifically, this Note discusses the recent decision in Development Bank of Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers, Inc.6 and the policy position
it signals to those parties considering the United States as a forum for
international arbitration.
I. The Federal Arbitration Act
and Domestic Case Law
The Federal Arbitration Act 7 guides enforcement of arbitration agreements in the United States. The Act's legislative history suggests that
Congress's purpose in enacting it was "to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate. ' 8 Domestic case law has interpreted the Act as favoring arbitration even at the risk of bifurcated proceedings or piecemeal resolution of litigation. 9 Bifurcated proceedings
may result where, for example, a federal court has the power to assert
jurisdiction over a federal securities claim, yet compels arbitration of
pendent state law claims. Until recently, however, the courts of appeals
were in conflict concerning the types of claims that should be referred to
arbitration. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had relied on the
"doctrine of intertwining." That doctrine permitted a district court to
deny a motion to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims when arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims were sufficiently intertwined factually and le[A] party may [at any time] request the Court specified in Article 16 to decide whether
a valid arbitration agreement exists and [if arbitral proceedings have commenced], whether
the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction [with regard to the dispute referred to it]. (2) While
such issue is pending with the Court, the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings
[unless the Court orders a stay of the arbitral proceedings].

Kerr, supra note I,at 22. Kerr suggests that excising article 17 from this draft of the Model
Law is unacceptable. Parties will become powerless, "and at the mercy of the arbitrator's
unrestricted powers until his deficiencies ultimately result in an award which can only then

be attacked and set aside." Id. at 17. Parties would still be free to make "exclusion agreements," however, which specifically restrict resort to the forum's courts of law. Such
agreements "should require evidence of the specific consent of the parties to every contract,
whether based on standard form or otherwise." Id. at 18.
6. 617 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
8. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985).
9. See id.; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983).
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gaily. 10 Apparently, those circuits partially construed the Act as designed
to promote speedy and efficient resolution of disputes, and bifurcated
proceedings would defeat that objective. Moreover, the courts were concerned that fact-finding conducted by arbitrators that touched on nonarbitrable claims might have some preclusive effect on later district court
proceedings." Conversely, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had
held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not permit a court to "substitute
[its] own views of economy and efficiency" for those of Congress.12
This conflict among the circuits apparently was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 13 In Dean Witter the Court

held that "the Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion
to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums."' 14 This decision
reflects the Court's view that Congress, by passing the Act, intended as
its principal goal to give predictability to the legitimate expectations of
those who agree to arbitration, notwithstanding the potential for inefficiency in certain cases.
Another decision issued a short time after Dean Witter further demonstrated the Supreme Court's commitment to give effect to arbitration
agreements by limiting court jurisdiction. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth'5 the Court held that statutory claims may be
within the purview of an arbitration agreement even though the agreement
16
does not specifically provide for their resolution through arbitration.
The Mitsubishi Court had no reservation about the competence of an
arbitration panel to deal with complex antitrust matters. Moreover, during
the Court's previous term, the Court had "held that Section 2 of the Act
declared a national policy applicable equally in state as well as federal
courts," and that it was not necessary to examine the source of state
authority that the party resisting arbitration had asserted before compelling arbitration. '7
10. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (1 Ith Cir.
1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981).
I1.See Dean Witter, 105 S. Ct. at 1240.
12. See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Surman
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
13. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
14. Id. at 1241.
15. 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985).
16. The Court recalled itsdecision in Wilko v.Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), where it had
expressed "hope for [the Act's] usefulness both incontroversies based on statutes or on
standards otherwise created." Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
17. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354 (citing the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852, 859-60 (1984).
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Two important doctrines have emerged from these decisions, at least
in the domestic context. First, courts cannot exert their jurisdiction over
arbitrable claims even though nonarbitrable claims are inextricably intertwined with them. Second, claims grounded in statutes are not immune
from arbitration. These statutory claims may, in fact, be deemed subject
to arbitration, regardless of their complexity, absent a specific provision
for their exclusion. 18 With these doctrines in mind, we now turn to a
decision that involved international arbitration in order to measure judicial
commitment to these doctrines in the international context.
II. Chemtex: A New Direction for American
Case Law in the International Commercial System
In 1976 American Philippine Fiber Industries, Inc. (APFI), a Philippine
corporation with its principal place of business in Manila, contracted with
Chemtex Fibers, Inc., a New York corporation, for assistance in dismantling a synthetic fiber plant located in Virginia and reassembling it in
the Philippines. Additionally, the contract called for Chemtex to supply
financing for the project in the amount of approximately five million dollars. Chemtex received promissory notes from APFI that were guaranteed
by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Eventually, APFI
defaulted on some of the notes, and DBP paid to Chemtex the amounts
due as guarantor.
Subsequently, DBP brought suit in federal district court against Chemtex, alleging fraud and unjust enrichment. DBP contended that Chemtex
presented false accounts of disbursements made on APFI's behalf. DBP
sought money damages to recover these unauthorized amounts. DBP also
included a count for civil violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 19 The violation was grounded in
Chemtex's alleged fraudulent use of the mails and international communications facilities. Chemtex moved to compel arbitration and to stay
proceedings in federal court. Chemtex based its motion on the arbitration
20
clause contained in the loan agreement.
DBP's initial response was that it acted only as a guarantor, not a
signatory, to the loan agreement. If that argument were accepted as cor18. Id. at 3355.
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
20. The arbitration clause provided:
Any dispute between the parties to this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration at
such place as may be agreed upon, and in the event of a failure so to agree within 30
days of the request to arbitrate, then in New York City under the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce. The agreement on any arbitration award made hereunder shall
be final.
617 F. Supp. at 56 n.2.
SUMMER 1987
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rect, then DBP would not be subject to arbitration. The court discounted
this contention because DBP did in fact sign the loan agreement, initialed
every page, and listed itself as a party to be noticed. DBP then argued
that its statutory RICO claim was not subject to arbitration. It is the
court's analysis of this second issue that is important as an indication of
the course of American case law as it relates to international arbitration.
And it is this second issue that carries with it the before-mentioned tension
between national sovereignty and international comity.
DBP relied upon a prior Second Circuit case, Samitri,2 1 as foundation
for its argument that the RICO claim was not arbitrable. Samitri involved
a joint venture arrangement among various foreign corporations for the
purpose of exploiting iron ore in Brazil. Eventually, Samitri, a Brazilian
corporation, brought an action in federal court against its venture partners, alleging a number of common law claims, including fraudulent inducement to enter into the project. Samitri also alleged federal RICO
violations. Samitri argued to the district court that the statutory RICO
claims were nonarbitrable. The district court analyzed the arbitrability of
the RICO claims under a policy balancing test. "On the one hand is the
policy which favors arbitration over litigation, especially where the dispute
presented involves a transaction in international commerce . . . On the
other hand ... is the important public interest in the enforcement of
RICO, which may make arbitration an inappropriate method for resolving
RICO claims." 22 The district court concluded that the public interest in
the enforcement of RICO was at least equal23to that favoring arbitration
and denied arbitration on the RICO counts.
The Chemtex court rejected DBP's attempt to use Samitri as controlling
precedent. The Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi,2 4 issued only
nine months after Samitri, had greatly weakened the conclusions in Samitri. Because Mitsubishi involved foreign parties subject to international
arbitration, its holdings were particularly relevant to the Chemtex litigation. The Mitsubishi Court had rejected the notion that statutory claims
were generally not arbitrable. 25 The specific statutory claims present in
21. S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
22. S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 574 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
23. The defendants apparently accepted the district court's finding of nonarbitrability of
the RICO counts because they did not cross-appeal retention of these claims for resolution
in the judicial forum. Samitri, however, did raise on appeal as error the district court's stay
of its RICO claims pending arbitration of the other issues. The Second Circuit disposed of
this point by finding no merit in Samitri's contention that it should be permitted to proceed
notwithstanding arbitration of other claims. "The decision to stay litigation of non-arbitrable
claims pending the outcome of litigation 'is one left to the district court . . . as a matter of
its discretion to control its docket.' " Samitri, 745 F.2d at 196 (citation omitted).
24. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
25. 105 S. Ct. at 3353.
VOL. 21, NO. 3
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Mitsubishi were alleged violations of the Sherman Act antitrust law. Although the Court refused to discard precedent that such claims were
nonarbitrable in the domestic context, 26 it held that
the concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
27
forthcoming in a domestic context.

In reaching this conclusion the Mitsubishi Court recalled two of its
previous leading decisions that touched on international commercial transactions, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 28 and The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co. 29 In The Bremen the Court enforced a forum-selection clause,
which specified England as the situs for dispute resolution, against an
American corporation seeking to change venue to the United States. 30 In
Scherk the Court permitted arbitration of a securities fraud claim resulting
from an international transaction even though the claim was not arbitrable
under domestic law. 3' It is worth noting, however, that the Mitsubishi
decision provoked a lengthy dissent by Justice Stevens, who came to the
opposite conclusion about the propriety of sending statutory claims to
32
arbitration, even in the international setting.

26. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. International Indus.,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
28. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
29. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
30. The Court had observed:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts ....
We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws,
and resolved in our courts.
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, quoted in Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3356.
31. 417 U.S. at 516-17.
32. Justice Stevens noted that "an arbitration clause should not normally be construed
to cover a statutory remedy that it does not expressly identify." 105 S. Ct. at 3362. Stevens
distinguished Scherk by noting that the statutory claim in that case was present only tangentially because the claim resulted from an alleged breach of contractual warranties. Id.
at 3364 & n. 12. According to Stevens, the Court previously had never interpreted a standard
arbitration clause referring to claims "arising out of or relating to a contract" to cover
statutory claims which touched only indirectly on the contractual relationship. Id. at 3365.
Rather, the Court had "refused to hold that an arbitration barred the assertion of a statutory
right." Id. Stevens points to the fact that express statutory remedies have been preserved
for the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77-77aa (1982), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). 105 S. Ct. at
3365-66. Interestingly, Stevens criticizes the majority's concern for international comity by
observing the nonconforming behavior of other nations. He cites the cases of Audi-NSU
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With Mitsubishi clearly pointing the way for disposition of the RICO
claim present in Chemtex, the district court concluded that "the interest
of the domestic community in enforcement of the federal anti-racketeering
statute in these circumstances is certainly no stronger than the interest
in the enforcement of American antitrust principles found wanting in
Mitsubishi, and is indeed arguably a great deal less strong." 33 The district
court ordered a stay of proceedings in federal court pending the completion of arbitration. Thus, the Chemtex court paved the way for referral
of yet one more type of statutory claim to the international arbitration
forum, notwithstanding the prior decision of the Second Circuit in Samitri,
34
which the court might have invoked to reach a contrary result.
III. Conclusion
Recent developments in American case law indicate an unmistakable
shift toward compelling arbitration of all claims arising under an arbitration clause in an international transaction. This trend is evident even
though some of these claims may be grounded in statutes that have been
held to be nonarbitrable in the domestic context as public interest issues.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi helped frame the current
American position in relation to the deference that should be accorded
international arbitration. The Supreme Court has demonstrated that it
places greater weight on respect for transnational tribunals and concerns
of international comity than on so-called public interest issues. This policy
choice contributes greatly to international commercial predictability when
parties choose the United States as the location for their arbitration. The
probability is now very low that claims will be able to be severed by one

Auto Union A.G. v. S.A. Adelin Petit & Cie., 5 Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 257,259 (1979),
and Compagnia Generale Construzioni v. Piersanti, 6 Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 229, 230
(1979). 105 S. Ct. at 3372 n.5. In the former case, a Belgian court refused to permit arbitration
of a dispute arising under a local statute limiting unilateral termination of an exclusive
distributorship. In the latter case, an Italian court held that labor disputes are not arbitrable
in that country. The supposed basis for the arbitrability of these issues would be these
countries' subscription to the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards), June 6, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 3, to which the United States is also a signatory. Therefore, Stevens concludes
that the United States need not defer to the principles of international comity when statutory
claims are present because of the lack of adherence by other countries to this proposition.
105 S. Ct. at 3372.
33. Chemtex, 617 F. Supp. at 57.
34. It is noteworthy that since the decision in Chemtex several courts have cited it as
support for the arbitrability of RICO claims in a purely domestic context. See, e.g., Bale
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650, 654 (D. Minn. 1986); Brener v. Becker
Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex
Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), where the Court observed that the majority of civil RICO claims
do not impact on the general society or involve critical national interests.
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party for litigation in American state or federal courts. Both Mitsubishi
and Chemtex disfavor bifurcated proceedings when the subject matter is
any dispute arising under an arbitration clause in an international transaction. Additionally, a party to an international arbitration agreement with
situs for arbitration other than the United States can now more easily rest
assured that an American court will not be persuaded to assert jurisdiction
where one party may be able jurisdictionally to bring suit in the United
States. Hopefully, other nations will follow the American lead and also
place a higher value on respect for private international agreements than
on vaguer notions of national sovereignty.
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